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Introduction
History repeats itself.
This is the common refrain that we have all recited since grade school. Yet all too often current events seem to be interpreted in a 
vacuum. All too often we view the pressing issues of the day as unique, and all too often we end up re-inventing the wheel trying to 
address them.
To be sure, the European sovereign-debt crisis raises issues and circumstances particular to a common market and the 21st century. At 
its heart, however, Europe’s dilemma is an all- too-familiar debt crisis, the likes of which are well known to citizens of emerging-market 
countries. This is not to dismiss the suffering of Europeans. Rather, it is to offer a ray of hope: Debt crises have happened before, and 
the world has learned a lesson or two about fixing them.
This paper draws lessons from the Latin American sovereign-debt crisis of the 1980s. These lessons are applicable to today’s Europe. 
Certainly, the world has changed since 1980, and Latin America is not Europe. Yet we feel these overarching lessons can help Europe 
emerge from the doldrums of recession. That Europe has repeated ineffective Latin American policy approaches suggests the urgency 
of this study. That Latin America ultimately uncovered a blueprint for recovery suggests optimism. 
Latin America lost a decade to its debt crisis. Europe need not. 
For 36 years, the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Bertelsmann Stiftung have developed an expertise in European and trans-Atlantic 
issues. As the Foundation expands to cover Latin America, we feel this is a perfect opportunity to demonstrate the relevance of the 
region to Europe. 
Such a cross-regional, cross-temporal investigation underscores our conviction that in a highly interconnected global economy, few 
developments are purely regional. And in a world where history so frequently repeats itself, no mistake need be repeated.   
We hope that you enjoy.
Annette Heuser    Andreas Esche 
Executive Director    Director
Bertelsmann Foundation   Bertelsmann Stiftung
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Executive Summary
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper outlines five lessons from the Latin American debt crises of 1982-1989 and 2001-2002 that are applicable to 
present-day Europe: 
•	Fiscal reform alone cannot resolve a debt crisis. Austerity must be an element of a larger strategy, and not the strategy itself.
•	The Latin American experience underscores the importance of economic growth in a recovery. A country that can grow can pay 
its debts.
•	Latin America’s Brady Bond program suggests a model for a market-friendly default that can trim debt overhang without exiling a 
country from international capital markets or a common currency union.
•	Argentina’s messy default in 2001 is not a blueprint for peripheral eurozone countries although important, but selective, lessons can 
be drawn from that event.
•	  Potential political blowback stemming from reform fatigue threatens progress. In Latin America, backlash to the Washington 
Consensus eventually boiled into a “pink tide” characterized by rollbacks on certain crisis-era reforms. It would be an act of hubris 
to assume a backlash could not occur in Europe as well. 
As part of the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Global Economic Dynamics (GED) project, the text outlines overarching histories, tendencies 
and best practices in global economics.  
The paper benefited from the insight and support of many individuals. These include first and foremost Bertelsmann Foundation 
Executive Director Annette Heuser and Bertelsmann Stiftung Director Andreas Esche, as well as GED project members Jan Arpe, 
Thiess Petersen, Ulrich Schoof and Johannes Köhler-Kaess. The paper owes much to the support of Tyson Barker, Andrew Cohen, 
Michael Derham, Eric Farnsworth, Cornelius Fleischhaker, Hauke Hartmann, Riordan Roett and Susan Segal.
Samuel George
Project Manager
March 1, 2013  
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A Familiar Crisis
The causes of the crisis are well known: 
A glut of investors sought higher returns 
over low, risk-free rates. Countries 
that for years demonstrated volatile 
macroeconomics were suddenly able 
to borrow excessively. Governments 
burned through loaned funds to 
support consumption and postponed 
painful reforms. The model appeared 
sustainable when growth seemed 
consistent and inevitable. But when the 
bottom fell out of the global economy, 
the weight of inefficient industries and 
bloated governments exposed soaring 
debt and deficits. 
The world waited with bated breath 
as the media reported the potentially 
existential consequences of a financial 
meltdown. With access to capital 
restricted or prohibitively expensive, a 
number of countries staved off default by 
turning to the lender of last resort, which 
provided bailout packages contingent 
upon austerity packages. The goliath 
to the north, whose facilities owned 
much of the debt, initially supported the 
harsh fiscal reforms that ground debtor 
economies to a halt.
Yes, without a doubt, the story of the 
Latin American debt crisis is well known. 
And its striking resemblance to the 
European sovereign-debt crisis grows 
out of shared underlying factors. 
Both crises began with periods of 
excessive lending to countries with 
unstable macroeconomic histories. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, the growing US 
trade deficit, Vietnam war spending 
and the first oil shock generated a 
massive pool of “eurodollars.”1 OPEC 
price hikes funneled billions of dollars 
east. Eventually, these funds would be 
recycled west in the form of loans to 
Latin America. 
The European sovereign debt crisis 
also began with a rash of borrowing. 
Amid unusually low long-term interest 
rates and a boom in US securitization 
investment, peripheral Europe received 
a strong influx of capital between 2002 
and 2008. Portuguese public debt, for 
example, increased from 48 percent of 
GDP to 72 percent during that span.2
In both cases, loan supply and demand 
fed off each other. In the 1980s, loans to 
Latin America appealed to banks, which 
used floating interest rates and high 
premiums to ensure profits for funds 
that were otherwise gathering dust. The 
process also appealed to Latin American 
sovereign borrowers who could not 
otherwise access capital without 
resorting to official sources and their 
nagging conditions. Oil importers and 
exporters took out loans — the former 
to finance pricier oil; the latter to expand 
production. Interest rates were high, but 
commodity prices (and, in some years, 
inflation) were higher.3
In 21st century Europe, countries such 
as Greece and Portugal jumped at the 
opportunity to borrow in their own 
currency, while lenders believed that the 
new monetary union implied security. 
Borrowing countries expected the good 
times to roll, as the capital inflow often 
ended up as extra public spending or tax 
cuts. Meanwhile, fiscal deficits, generally 
within the Maastricht Treaty band in 
the mid-1990s, expanded rapidly in the 
2000s, with the Greek and Portuguese 
figures hitting double digits.
In both cases, a deteriorating global 
economy left the debt burden to sour into 
a crisis. When oil prices tripled with the 
second oil shock in 1979, Latin American 
import bills spiked while the US recession 
led to plummeting commodities prices. 
As the US tightened monetary policy, 
the floating interest on Latin American 
debt rose to nearly 20 percent by 1981.5 
When Mexico threatened sovereign 
default in August 1982, the reality of a 
full-fledged debt crisis crystallized. With 
lending effectively frozen throughout 
Latin America, much of the region was 
engulfed. 
In Europe, the 2008 financial crisis 
derailed debt sustainability. Lack 
of short-term credit punished the 
European banking sector, leading to 
the Irish government’s fateful decision 
to guarantee in full private bank debt. 
Spain, which funneled a good deal of 
its borrowed money into construction, 
suffered the burst of the real-estate 
bubble. Greece and Portugal weighed 
down their books with debt during 
the 2003-2007 boom and could not 
finance deficits when lending froze and 
premiums increased. 
This précis is neither controversial 
nor original, but rather a summary of 
conventional wisdom. Far more difficult 
than getting into a debt crisis is getting 
out of one. Since European Central 
Bank (ECB) President Mario Draghi’s 
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announcement of unlimited sovereign 
bond purchases from crisis-plagued 
members states in September of 2012, 
spreads have eased in countries such as 
Spain and Italy. This, however, does not 
mean the Euro crisis is over – only that 
it has moved from an acute to a chronic 
phase. How can a country shed debt while 
mired in recession? How can a country 
grow when it cannot pay interest? Can a 
structured default ease the debt burden 
without excommunicating a country from 
international finance? Latin America 
faced these questions in the 1980s and 
Europe faces them today. 
A Caveat
In the 1980s, Chile developed its 
vineyards to stimulate non-traditional 
exports. “Start producing wine,” however, 
would hardly be a lesson of value to 
European countries that have been 
exporting the drink since the days of the 
Phocaea in France (600 BC). 
Latin America is not Europe. Chronically 
underdeveloped, Latin America emerged 
from its debt crisis with the capacity 
for rapid growth. Europe lacks any such 
slack. A common market represents 
challenges and opportunities for Europe 
that were not part of the Latin American 
 
experience. In all of the subsequent five 
lessons, the fundamental differences 
between the Latin American and the 
European situations are easily noted. 
But spotting the differences is easy. The 
challenge lies in identifying overarching 
trends that can point the way to 
transferrable solutions. Each of the 
following five lessons includes useful 
experience for Europe. 
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Lesson 1: Austerity Alone Cannot Solve a Debt Crisis
Austerity in the time of 
recession - How to lose a 
decade 
Since the true scope of the European 
sovereign debt crisis emerged in 2010, 
the crisis response has focused heavily 
on fiscal reforms. Whether through the 
six-pack of reforms or the speeches of 
French President François Hollande, 
growth-oriented reform has been part 
of the debate, but it has not resonated 
in concrete policy actions as it has 
with austerity reforms. Latin America 
attempted a similar response in 1980. 
It cost the continent a decade of growth 
and development, and it did not solve 
the debt crisis. Persistent yet ineffective 
emphasis on austerity led to years of 
lackluster growth in Latin America, 
now collectively referred to as “The 
Lost Decade”. 
Latin America and Austerity 
As bank lending to Latin America ground 
to a halt in the fall of 1982, a consensus 
emerged among debtor governments, 
lending banks and the international 
financial institutions: The region’s 
problem was not one of solvency, but 
of liquidity. Prevailing theory held that 
countries such as Mexico, with 72 billion 
barrels of petroleum and natural gas in 
reserve, had the assets to meet debts – 
just not the cash at hand.
From 1982 to 1988, Latin American 
governments attempted to generate 
massive fiscal surpluses through 
internally and externally oriented 
austerity measures. Internally, these 
measures leaned on budget cuts, tax 
increases and the privatization of bloated 
state-owned enterprises. Externally, 
austerity demanded a current-account 
surplus that, in the short term, could be 
generated only by import suppression. 
Through tariffs, quotas and licenses, 
Latin American imports dropped from 
US$100 billion in 1981 to US$40 billion 
in 1983.6 
Meanwhile, rather than supporting a 
debt restructuring program that would 
represent a loss for commercial banks, 
the IMF lent more money to Latin 
America to cover immediate interest 
payments, with these funds contingent 
upon adopting “adjustment” policies 
that would promote fiscal consolidation. 
With the emphasis on belt-tightening 
and little attention paid to growth, the 
results were disastrous. Per capita GDP 
shrank 0.9 percent across the region in 
the 1980s, while the percentage of those 
living in poverty increased from 35 in 
1980 to 41 in 1990.7 Moreover, debt-to-
GDP ratios actually increased during the 
years of austerity, as government revenue 
failed to keep pace with the growing 
debt burden. Mired in recession, Latin 
American countries struggled just to 
make interest payments, despite posting 
current-account surpluses.
Shock and Flaw 
The austerity measures certainly 
shocked Latin American economies. In 
Chile, where reforms included value-
added-tax increases and reduced public 
employment, per capita GDP dropped 
9.1 percent from 1981 to 1985. In Peru, 
where the 1990 value of public social 
spending was but 21 percent of the 1980 
value, an already poor population faced 
vicious GDP swings that included years 
of 11.8, 8.7 and 11.7 percent contraction. 
In Mexico, real wages fell 30 percent 
just between 1982 and 1984.9 Of interest 
to modern-day Europe, region-wide 
austerity caused trade within Latin 
America to nearly halve, falling from 
US$100 billion in 1981 to US$56 billion 
in 1983. 
But the austerity measures did not end 
the debt crisis. Import suppression never 
created the windfall revenue required 
to meet debt payments. For one, most 
exporters were private, whereas most 
debt was public. Secondly, the stiff 
decline in consumption limited taxable 
transactions, while the decrease in 
imports limited tariff revenues, even as 
the tariffs themselves increased. 
As noted, debt–to-GDP ratios increased 
throughout the region. In Mexico, a 
country that pursued fiscal cuts with 
particular zeal, public expenditures 
actually jumped from 21 percent of 
GDP in 1981 to 31 percent in 1987. 
This rise reflected the heavy burden of 
interest payments, which accounted 
for 50 percent of central-government 
expenditures in 1987.10
IMF financing helped countries cover 
these payments, but total outstanding 
debt ballooned. The aim of this so called 
“involuntary lending” was to tide over 
inherently solvent countries until they 
could re-establish the liquidity needed 
to pay off debts. However, given region-
wide contraction in consumption, 
interest financing simply prolonged 
LESSON 1:
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the crisis without diminishing the 
debt burden. 
Eventually, creditors realized that hope 
of any resolution rested upon a return 
to growth and a trimming of the debt 
overhang. It just took them five years to 
figure it out. 
Europe’s Lost Decade?
Just as in Latin America, the initial 
response to the European sovereign debt 
crisis focused intensely on austerity. The 
Washington parlor joke holds that IMF 
stands for “It’s Mostly Fiscal.” If anything, 
IMF fervor for fiscal reform was outdone 
by that of the EU. As peripheral risk 
premiums rose hundreds of basis points 
against German bonds, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Cyprus all turned to official 
funding. Spanish banks also tapped the 
eurozone’s bailout funds in late 2012. 
Just as in Latin America, bailout 
packages came with a stiff price. Greece 
promised to reduce its fiscal deficit 
from 13.6 percent of GDP to 2.6 percent 
by 2014, with similar pledges coming 
from Ireland, Portugal and Spain.11 Italy, 
having avoided the primary deficits of 
its neighbors, promised to put a dent 
in its debt-to-GDP ratio, which topped 
120 percent.
Just as in Latin America, the inability 
to generate rapid surpluses on the 
production side forced the recalibration 
to focus on consumption cuts. These 
austerity measures featured public-
sector wage cuts, increased tax revenue, 
pension freezes, social-welfare trimming, 
reduced minimum wages and weakened 
labor protection, among others.12 Italy 
went as far as to force the resignation of 
raffish Prime Minister Silvio Burlusconi 
(1994 -1995; 2001 -2006; 2008 -2011) to 
underscore that the party was over.  
Some have lambasted Europe’s tack 
towards fiscal reform. Influential 
American economist Paul Krugman 
referred to European leaders as 
“technocrats inducing their nations to 
accept the bitter austerity medicine; 
again and again, failing to deliver 
results.”13 Yet, with peripheral primary 
deficits in double digits and unit-labor 
costs over five times those in Germany,14 
any recovery path would have required 
fiscal recalibration. 
Spanish firms would not offer full-time 
employment while facing excessive 
severance costs. Greece could never 
be fiscally solvent without increasing 
tax revenue. Italy could not hope to 
flex a growth muscle while bound by 
rigid labor markets. Even in France, 
if public spending is to come down from 
a whopping 57 percent of national 
output,15 then perhaps the retirement 
age will need to increase from 60 to 62. 
Just as in Latin America, a measure of 
austerity was undoubtedly necessary. 
But alone, it cannot solve the crisis. 
Even the IMF, once a crusader wielding 
a righteous blade at scurrilous budgets, 
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now acknowledges the error of pounding 
austerity into a recession. In October 
2012, the Fund’s chief economist, Olivier 
Blanchard, co-authored an appendix 
(“box”) in the biannual World Economic 
Outlook that challenged conventional 
wisdom on the matter. Previously, 
economists had gauged short-term 
fiscal multipliers, which measure the 
ratio of change in income to government 
spending, at roughly 0.5. This assumption 
implied that government spending made 
little impact on growth. Blanchard’s 
analysis suggested a multiplier of up 
to 1.7. These findings have led the IMF 
to discourage harsh austerity during 
times of recession and to recommend 
spreading fiscal reform over time while 
simultaneously pursuing growth.16 
Austerity Alone Can  
Prolong the Crisis
If Latin America is any indicator, the 
concentrated focus on austerity with 
only lip service paid to growth could, in 
fact, prolong the debt crisis. Low growth 
and the stigma of IMF intervention could 
enforce wide spreads on peripheral 
debt, perpetuating a “self-fulfilling debt 
crisis.” 17 As Latin America learned, 
austerity alone simply kicks the can down 
the road and likely implies subsequent 
ECB intervention that jeopardizes yet 
more core-European capital. The ironic 
lesson appears to be that austerity alone 
– often the preferred course of creditors 
– limits the ability of debtors to service 
loans and to emerge from debt crisis.  
Europe now trudges towards the three-
year anniversary of realizing “severe 
irregularities” in Greek public finance still 
mired in recession. Greek GDP contracted 
6.9 percent in 2011, and another six 
percent in 201218 while Portugal has 
strung together nine successive quarters 
of contraction.19 Meanwhile, the Spanish 
recession has reached five quarters and 
unemployment now tops 25 percent.20 As 
peripheral economies appear reformed 
but asphyxiated, perhaps Europe must 
accept a vital lesson from Latin America: 
Austerity alone cannot solve the crisis. 
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Lesson: If a Country Can 
Grow, It Can Pay Its Debt
In the early 1980s, Latin American 
economies were living large on excessive 
sovereign debt and deficits. Austerity 
brought these freewheeling economies 
to a screeching halt. But Latin America 
needed a return to growth, to pique 
investor appetite in the region again and 
to pave the way for debt restructuring. 
Europe has also used austerity measures 
to tame out-of-control borrowing 
and spending. Now, it must re-start 
the engine.
Latin America’s Re-focus 
on Growth
By the mid-1980s, Latin American 
economists realized that the debt burden 
could not be lifted in a contractionary 
economic environment. Painful austerity 
may have been necessary, but Latin 
America needed a program for the future 
– not one that just addressed sins of 
the past. The Baker Plan, introduced by 
the eponymous US Treasury Secretary 
James Baker in 1985, did not reverse or 
rebuke the austerity measures. Rather, 
the plan argued for growth-oriented 
policies as the logical next step for 
countries that had already endured 
painful adjustments. 
History remembers the Baker Plan as 
a failure – too little done too late. The 
additional lending attached to the plan 
proved but a stopgap. Shortcomings 
aside, however, the Baker Plan re-
oriented the conversation from austerity 
alone and towards a responsible growth 
model. Perhaps most importantly, the 
re-focus originated on the side of debt 
holders. Latin America always would 
have preferred growth, but the debt 
holders needed to accept that austerity 
alone would not repay principal.  
Growth After Austerity – 
Export Expansion
Export expansion eventually became the 
logical vehicle for a return to growth. 
Latin American countries spent much 
of the 1950s, 60s and 70s constructing 
formidable trade barriers while 
nurturing domestic manufacturers. As a 
result, “state champions” lacked direct 
competition while insulated currencies 
led to overpriced exports – two issues 
of many that undermined international 
competitiveness.21
With a re-focus on growth, however, 
Latin America would lean heavily on 
comparative advantages in cheap 
labor and natural resources to pursue 
export-led growth. Indicative of the 
overall policy reversal, Mexico joined 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (a precursor to the World Trade 
Organization) in 1986. Most Latin 
American nations quickly followed suit. 
While countries did not abandon 
austerity, they did demonstrate a 
newfound flexibility in pursuit of growth. 
The Chilean military dictatorship, 
previously a neoliberal stalwart, actually 
rolled back on certain Washington 
Consensus reforms, implementing 
bailouts, subsidies, credit supplies 
and technological aid for infant export 
industries. The plan worked. Chilean GDP 
increased at an average annual rate of 
6.8 percent between 1985 and 1990 while 
unemployment fell from 21.4 percent 
to 5.7 percent.22 Meanwhile, Chile 
established itself as a globally relevant 
exporter of non-traditional goods such 
as salmon and wine. In the 23 years from 
1985 to the global recession of 2008, 
Chile averaged 8.42 percent annual growth 
in exports,23 with exports increasing from 
21 percent of GDP in 1981 to 42 percent 
of GDP in 2008.24 By 2010, the total value 
of Chilean exports exceeded US$61.65 
billion.25 
Monetary Policy: The Value 
of a Devalue 
Currency devaluation is not a panacea, 
but monetary policy must be part of a 
growth strategy. In an effort to stimulate 
exports, nearly all Latin American 
countries26 devalued their currencies in 
the 1980s and early 1990s.27 Chile entered 
the debt crisis with a fixed currency 
established in 1979. Initial austerity 
required contractionary monetary policy, 
and the trade surplus flipped to a deficit 
while GDP plunged 13.6 percent in 1982.
 
The stiff recession forced Chile to 
abandon its fixed-exchange rate, and, 
in mid-1982 an 85-percent devaluation 
was implemented. This move generated 
competitive prices for the newly 
invigorated export sector. New copper 
mines and cellulose plants dotted the 
Andes, while vineyards expanded deep 
into the Chilean heartland.28 
Tellingly, Chile’s return to growth 
correlated with increased foreign direct 
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investment (FDI), which moved from 
a negligible net surplus in the 1980s 
to a US$17.3 billion surplus in 2011.29 
Moreover, Chilean external debt has 
since increased exponentially, yet 
sustainability has improved dramatically 
with steep declines in debt-to-GDP 
ratios. This transition underscores a 
key fact: The problem was not the debt 
itself, but rather investors’ refusal to 
roll over the debt. Having returned to 
growth, Chile became an attractive 
investment destination. 
What It Means for Europe
The May 6, 2012 election of François 
Hollande as president of France has 
re-hashed the austerity-versus-growth 
debate. Hollande represents a Keynesian 
faction arguing that Europe cannot cut 
its way out of crisis. Popular culture 
portrays him as a boxer squaring off with 
austerity stalwarts who countered that 
any fiscal relaxation would undermine 
what tepid investor confidence has 
been generated by austerity. The battle 
lines between pro-growth populists and 
austere realists were drawn, with cynical 
journalists arguing the point moot since 
neither approach would work anyway. 
However, as the Latin American 
experience suggests, austerity and 
rekindled growth may not be zero-
sum options. Initial reforms have been 
compared to a necessary but painful 
operation. If so, the surgery ought not 
last forever, and the patient must have a 
rehabilitation plan. The EU has certainly 
paid lip service to growth, but according 
to Der Spiegel, this has amounted to little 
more than “hot air” and “accounting 
tricks.”30 Just as in the early years of the 
Latin American sovereign-debt crisis, 
much of the power remains in the hands 
of debt holders, and, consequently, 
much of the emphasis remains on fiscal 
tightening. With the Baker Plan, debt 
holders finally realized that a re-focus on 
growth was in their best interest.31 Core-
Europe debt holders might do well to do 
the same. 
European Growth After 
Austerity
The €500 billion question32 has thus 
become: How (and where) can Europe 
generate growth? Abundant in resources 
and cheap labor, Latin America keyed 
in on export-led growth. While exports 
figure to be instrumental in any EU 
recovery, few member states export 
substantially to high-growth developing 
nations. With many members exporting 
primarily within the eurozone, any 
export-led growth under the current 
model would be of the beggar-thy-
neighbor variety and would be unlikely 
to propel the region from crisis. 
But Europe, as Latin America, 
can consolidate strengths. Europe 
holds comparative advantages in 
educated labor and mid- to up-market 
manufacturing. Member states may not 
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trade intensely with BRICs, but they do 
trade heavily with developed nations 
increasingly accustomed to technological 
enhancement from the boardroom to the 
bathroom. Core-European economies 
(in this case including northern Italy) 
have had far more success exploiting 
this manufacturing potential. However, 
peripheral Europe could also be a 
cost-effective location for skilled 
manufacturing, especially given recent 
industry trends towards manufacturing 
in the developed west.33 
While Latin America deconstructed 
barriers to trade to maximize its global 
advantages, analysts frequently propose 
that peripheral Europe can deconstruct 
structural restraints to improve labor-
market competitiveness. A number of the 
proposed reforms, such as reductions 
to minimum wages, unemployment 
benefits and job protection, would fall 
disproportionately upon a vulnerable 
segment of the European labor market. 
Moreover, whereas minimum-wage 
reductions produce clear benefits in 
microeconomics textbooks, the real-life 
evidence is far from conclusive.34
   
However, certain structural reforms 
could help restore growth to Europe. 
Italy, for example, enjoys a strong 
industrial base, a large domestic market 
and a well-educated workforce. Yet the 
country has struggled to respond to the 
euro crisis owing to a rigidly constrained 
labor market. The World Bank’s Doing 
Business study found Italy to be an 
inordinately difficult location to start 
a business and to obtain construction 
permits (averaging 234 days and costing 
184.2 percent of per capita GDP). The 
study found it easier for a business to get 
electricity in Fiji than in Italy. It is thus 
little surprise that Italian unemployment 
has increased annually since 2007, 
rising from 6.1 percent to more than 
10 percent.36 
Such structural inefficiencies have 
punished peripheral competitiveness. 
Bureaucracy and regulations helped 
drop Italy to 42nd place in the World 
Economic Forum’s annual Global 
Competitiveness Report 2012-13. Greece 
slipped to 96th, behind Honduras and 
Botswana. Minimizing costly and time-
consuming regulations could make it 
significantly easier to do business in 
Europe and help firms maximize the 
potential of strong infrastructure and 
educated workforces in countries such 
as Portugal and Italy. 
Bolstered by greater flexibility, Europe 
can generate growth through increased 
service-sector integration within the 
common market. Services account 
for 70 percent of EU employment and 
represent the strongest magnet for 
regional FDI, yet 94 percent of EU-15 
services are consumed domestically 
(meaning Spaniards consume services 
from Spanish firms).38 Opening this 
market (especially as demographics 
portend explosive healthcare demands) 
could generate the competition needed 
to instigate growth. Until now, bruising 
political battles featuring straw men and 
“Polish plumbers” have curtailed this 
option. 
Europe can leverage its experience. 
As countries from the Far East to the 
Amazon rapidly urbanize, forward-
thinking EU firms will find niches to 
export know-how. Germany, already 
a global leader in green energy, has 
emerged as a lead exporter of solar 
panels to Brazil. Spain, desperate for 
growth, could also be a key player in this 
field. In exporting know-how, Europe can 
link into emerging-market growth spurts.
Monetary Policy: A Backdoor 
Devaluation
Put simply, Latin America wished to 
increase exports in the 1980s and 
devalued its currencies to facilitate this 
effort. Lacking monetary levers, European 
states cannot unilaterally exercise this 
option unless they exit the common 
currency – an option the Bertelsmann 
Foundation believes would have steep 
financial consequences.39 However, the 
overall region would likely benefit from a 
weaker euro. A loose monetary policy, or 
“backdoor devaluation,” could stimulate 
extra-regional exports and add some 
slack to rigid labor markets.
 
While the trauma of a failed currency 
has been scarred into core Europe’s 
collective memory, the current obsession 
with inflation recalls Don Quixote 
attacking windmills in La Mancha. 
Inflation has been far from explosive in 
the eurozone,40 but the ECB has twice 
prematurely raised base rates, each time 
precipitating nadirs in the recession. A 
degree of quantitative easing along the 
lines of that conducted by the US Federal 
Reserve could generate a productive 
backdoor devaluation of the euro. Such 
a policy is especially important because 
individual states lack their own monetary 
levers. With only fiscal tools available, 
ECB inaction could force desperate 
nations into revising fiscal policy, thus 
reversing any gains from austerity.
 
Hyperinflation was, of course, a 
characteristic of many Latin American 
economies in the 1980s. This inflation 
generally stemmed from printing 
currency to cover deficits. This would 
not be the purpose of looser eurozone 
monetary policy. For Europe, a 
marginally higher inflation target could 
incentivize private-sector spending, help 
address the debt overhang and not be a 
mechanism to cover deficits. 
From Austerity or Growth to 
Austerity then Growth 
If there is any lesson from Latin America, 
it is that the path does not fork at 
austerity or growth. Rather, the prudent 
path follows austerity then growth (or 
austerity during growth, as the IMF 
might have it). As in Latin America, belt-
tightening in Europe is non-negotiable. 
Just as Mexico could not borrow its way 
out of debt, neither can Spain stimulate 
itself out of recession. However, once 
the fiscal reforms are implemented, 
growth must be restored to avoid the 
downward spiral that sank Latin America 
and appears capable of doing the same 
in Europe.  
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Lesson: After “Austerity 
then Growth”, Debt 
Restructuring Can End  
the Crisis
Default. The word, eschewed by 
policymakers in public, conjures chaotic 
images. Perhaps a nationalistic firebrand 
assumes leadership in a peripheral 
country and renounces austerity, forcing 
the IMF to withhold bailout funds. 
Imagine a disorganized currency exit: a 
plummeting drachma, escudo or peseta. 
Envision speculators turning against 
other peripheral European countries, 
spreads widening and the dominoes 
beginning to fall as in East Asia in 1997. 
But that is not how the 1980s debt crisis 
ended. Rather, a market-friendly debt-
swap program – though representing 
a sizeable write-down for creditors – 
facilitated Latin America’s return to 
growth and a return of capital. Named 
after US Treasury Secretary Nicholas 
Brady (1988 – 1993), the Brady Plan 
has been cited by some as the cure for 
the Latin American debt crisis. Other 
sources find the plan inconsequential in 
the financial herd’s return to the region. 
The truth lies in the middle. To step into 
a new future, Latin America needed to 
break from its past. 
The Brady Bond model was at one 
point heavily debated in Europe, yet 
momentum for the approach petered 
out, perhaps lost in the cacophony of 
competing ideas. This is unfortunate: 
The Brady Plan offered a structured 
default that allowed Latin America 
to ease the debt burden and return 
to growth without being shunned by 
international capital markets. Europe 
should take notes.
The End of the Latin 
American Debt Crisis
The years of austerity forced necessary 
fiscal consolidation, and the re-focus on 
growth helped Latin America close ranks 
around comparative advantages. These 
maneuvers prepared the new world 
to step into the future, but the debt 
overhang kept it bolted to its past. Rising 
interest rates were “dead weight on 
economic activity, paralyzing investment 
until it could be eradicated.”43
Latin American countries established 
primary surpluses, but debt-servicing 
costs wiped the nominal balance into 
deficit.44 Any growth generated by 
reforms was promptly shipped overseas 
as interest payments. With regional 
debt more than three times the value 
of total exports,45 how could Latin 
America even begin to pay off principal? 
Without addressing the overhang, the 
region could not grow. Without growth, 
investors remained skeptical, banks 
would not lend and the debt crisis 
trudged on. 
Much like Diego Maradona, by the end 
of the 1980s Latin America needed 
a haircut. 
Though technically a default, the debt 
reduction needed to be executed 
to avoid banishing the region from 
international credit markets. Rather, the 
default needed to facilitate the return to 
growth. The 1989 Brady Plan offered the 
framework for such debt restructuring, 
and, while not the sole cause, it 
immediately preceded significant re-
investment in the region. 
The Brady Plan allowed banks to convert 
non-performing or distressed loans 
into bonds – a fungible commodity 
that could be sold back to issuing 
governments or traded on a secondary 
market. These “Brady Bonds” included 
value writedowns (paying 65 cents on 
the dollar in Mexico or 16 cents on the 
dollar in Costa Rica). But the bonds 
offered holders different mechanisms for 
these writedowns, including discounted 
cash buy-backs, discounted exchanges, 
asset swaps and securitization of 
discounted debt. 
The scheme proved popular. Anxious to 
rid themselves of loans unlikely to be 
repaid, more than 90 percent of Mexican 
debt holders opted for the voluntary 
trade-ins by 1990, generating a Mexican 
sovereign haircut worth over US$14 
billion, 29.8 percent of outstanding debt. 
Brady Bonds generated similar savings in 
Argentina (US$6.28 billion haircut, 32.5 
percent of total debt), Uruguay (US$425 
million, 26.4 percent) and Venezuela 
(US$3.79 billion, 19.2 percent).48
The beauty of Brady Bonds was that 
they facilitated Latin America’s return 
to capital markets. The Brady Plan 
offered an exit to investors fed up with 
the region while paving a path to growth 
for investors who wanted to stay in by 
alleviating the overhang. Meanwhile, 
Brady Bonds offered an intriguing new 
investment mechanism in a market that 
had frozen to a near standstill through 
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the 1980s. With bullet maturities 
safeguarded by matching US Treasury 
notes, the Brady Bonds enhanced 
creditworthiness, and thus the market 
required lower rates of return. 
Brady Bonds did not eliminate Latin 
American debt, but debt in itself may 
never have been the problem. In fact, the 
early 1990s featured rapid investment 
in Latin America that generated an 
overall increase in debt. These hot money 
investments proved mismatched and 
ultimately deleterious,49 but the fact 
remains that a decade-long trend of 
capital outflow had been reversed. 
Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela and 
Brazil (large countries that pursued 
the Brady Plan) together averaged four 
percent annual growth from 1990 to 
1994 while combined external debt in 
these countries actually increased 26 
percent. Investors attached little stigma 
to Brady countries, and, in 2005, Brazil 
successfully issued US$1.44 billion in 
bonds denominated in domestic reais.50
For Europe, Le Brady Plan?
Economists might call it restructuring; 
investors could call it a haircut. Media 
might name it after its founder, as they 
did with Brady Bonds. Central bankers 
could call it amicable; politicians will 
call it voluntary. The bottom line with 
bond swaps is that creditors receive less 
than they were promised. Euphemisms 
abound, but at heart it is a default.
There are good reasons that countries 
avoid defaulting, not least of which 
is subsequent pariah status in 
international capital markets. There are 
good reasons that bond holders avoid 
“voluntary restructuring”, not least of 
which is significant losses on existing 
investments. In the 1980s, Citibank51 
muddled through five years of the Latin 
American debt crisis before concluding 
that 35 cents on the dollar was better 
than zero cents on the dollar. 
The Brady Model was initially proposed 
in Europe and subsequently overlooked, 
most likely for the aforementioned 
issues. Has the time come for Europe 
to reconsider the notion and to accept 
a similar haircut on peripheral European 
debt? Or must the global economy suffer 
five years of core Europe’s chasing the 
fantasy of full payment? If the Latin 
American debt crisis is any indication, 
the longer the EU procrastinates, the 
more the debt overhang will grind on 
economies, putting steep pressure on 
the same European banks reluctant to 
accept a haircut. 
There is, of course, precedent for a 
European swap program. In March 2012, 
Greece successfully engaged more than 
86 percent of private credit holders 
in a 53.5 percent haircut on US$234 
billion in outstanding bonds.52 Major 
institutions, including Deutsche Bank 
and Allianz, accepted the “voluntary” 
exchange. This particular model would 
not likely be applicable throughout 
vulnerable Europe,53 and its retroactive 
collective action clause (CAC) would 
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not be considered “market friendly”. But 
the swap did suggest that an exchange 
was possible. 
While peripheral European debt-to-
GDP ratios exceeding 100 percent are 
clearly hard to defend, the Latin America 
experience suggests that the problem 
is not necessarily the debt itself but 
rather the frozen capital markets. By 
transitioning bank loans to bonds, 
the Brady notes added sorely needed 
liquidity to an arid market. 
While much of European debt is 
already issued in fungible bond form, 
an exchange program could still add 
liquidity to issuances rotting in (and 
weighing down) European banks. New 
York University economists Nicholas 
Economides and Roy Smith present a 
“Trichet Bond”, collateralized by zero-
coupon bonds issued by the ECB. 
Existing holders would trade in their 
underperforming bonds for Trichet 
Bonds of longer duration and at current 
market value (as opposed to original 
par value).54
ECB collateralization would offer 
heightened security, while a longer tenor 
would postpone significant quantities of 
looming peripheral debt, thus softening 
the immediate crisis of uncertainty that 
has pushed premiums to unsustainable 
heights.55 The sales pitch would offer 
investors a trade of quality for quantity 
(in terms of returns). As with Brady 
Bonds, the enhanced creditworthiness 
of the new notes would likely put 
downward pressure on interest rates. 
The €50056 billion question becomes: 
Would European bond holders (often 
banks) accept such a trade-in? The 
Latin American experience suggests 
that part of the answer will stem from 
Europe’s ability to demonstrate growth 
potential. By 1990, Latin America had 
established a plausible path towards 
growth, and investors saw it in their 
interest to shed the debt overhang.57 For 
European banks, the trade would offer 
the additional advantage of clearing out 
vulnerable credit that clouds any ability 
to evaluate recapitalization efforts. 
 
In a policy brief for the Inter-American 
Development Bank, Eduardo Cavallo 
and Eduardo Fernández-Arias note that 
with the advent of Brady Bonds, markets 
again became “forward looking… 
recognizing that the new regime 
emerging with the cleanup offered good 
business opportunities for both foreign 
direct investment and portfolio flows.”58
Europe remains mired in the “mess” 
phase. With significant capital tied up 
in peripheral debt, core-European banks 
are still hesitant to accept haircuts on 
their investments. American commercial 
banks shared this hesitancy in the 
1980s, trudging through a decade before 
accepting the inevitable writedowns. 
The reluctance may be understandable, 
but Latin American history suggests 
that structured, preemptive action 
is preferable to a messy default 
under duress. 
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Lesson: Europe has 
much to learn from the 
Argentine default of 
2001, but the soundest 
takeaways are often not 
the most obvious.
Given the similarities between 
millennium-era Argentina and today’s 
Greece, as well as Argentina’s apparent 
post-crisis success, some wonder if a 
Greek default and currency exit might 
not be the worst option for Athens.59 
However, Argentina’s “recovery” would 
not easily be replicated, and the 
Argentine model should by no means be 
considered a blueprint for Greece. This 
lesson argues that Europe has much to 
learn from the Argentine default of 2001, 
but the soundest takeaways are often 
not the most obvious.
A Messy Default,
A Swift Recovery
In 2001, Argentina suffered the 
proverbial “messy default”. Ten years 
earlier, the country had legally pegged 
one peso to one American dollar 
in an effort to curb hyperinflation. 
Known as “convertibility”, the scheme 
enjoyed tremendous initial success as 
Argentina issued billions of dollars in 
international bonds. By the turn of the 
century, however, macroeconomic forces 
overwhelmed attempts to defend the 
peg. To the tune of protesters banging 
pots and pans throughout the streets of 
Buenos Aires, Argentina was forced to 
disband the currency board. 
Many of the deepest fears forecasters 
share over a chaotic Greek eurozone exit 
(a “Grexit”) occurred in Argentina. The 
newly untethered peso plummeted to a 
quarter of its pegged value, representing 
massive losses for Argentines who owed 
debt in dollars. Political instability led 
to a revolving door on the executive’s 
office, with three presidents occupying 
La Casa Rosada over a two-week span. 
Confrontations in the streets left scores 
dead as Argentines famously chanted 
“Que se vayan todos! (Everybody out!)” at 
their government. 
Over the next eight years, however, 
something odd happened. Despite 
pariah status in the international capital 
markets, Argentina began to grow – 
rapidly. After suffering a 10.9 percent 
GDP contraction in 2002, Argentina 
posted growth rates of 10.5, 9.0, 9.2 and 
8.5 percent from 2003 through 2006, and 
would go on to average 5.91 percent 
annual GDP growth in the decade 
immediately following the largest-ever 
sovereign default.61
A cursory analysis suggests that despite 
a messy exit, or perhaps because of the 
messy exit, Argentina regained a degree 
of competitiveness and quickly re-
established growth rates that peripheral 
Europe would welcome. Could 
Argentina’s rebound be a blueprint for 
Greece?
A Suboptimal Blueprint 
While there may be strong similarities,62 
Argentina does not offer a blueprint for 
Greece. Argentina’s recovery exploited 
particular circumstances that would 
not easily be replicated by Greece. An 
agricultural powerhouse, Argentina 
began its renaissance just as Chinese 
demand for commodities exploded. 
Argentine export prices spiked (soy 
values increased from roughly US$180 
per ton in 2001 to US$500 per ton in 
2011) as did volumes (Argentine soy 
exports doubled from 1998 to 2008), 
generating windfall profits for farmers 
from La Pampa to Patagonia.63
The commodity boom portended overall 
Argentine trade expansion to high-
growth regions. In 2003, the first year of 
the Argentine recovery, total exports to 
China more than doubled from US$1.24 
billion to US$2.73 billion. The next year 
they increased by 20 percent and the 
year after that by 17 percent. By 2008, 
Argentine exports to China topped out 
at US$9.36 billion, or 754 percent of the 
2001 value.64 The devalued peso may 
have facilitated increased trade. But 
it was high growth and high demand 
from the Far East, the Middle East and 
neighboring Brazil that gave Argentina 
significant room to expand. 
Group walking tours of Santorini aside, 
Greece does not offer exports of either 
great value or demand to rapidly 
developing economies such as China. 
In fact, none of Greece’s top three 
export destinations – Germany, Italy and 
Cyprus – are forecast to grow more than 
1.7 percent between 2011 and 2015.65 
Even areas of potential export growth 
face obstacles. International tourists, for 
example, might be intrigued by cheaper 
holidays but put off by political and 
social unrest. Furthermore, whereas 
Argentina enjoyed extensive fertile 
plains for agricultural expansion, it 
could take years to adequately expand 
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Greece’s tourist capacity, where such 
expansion is possible. 
The Bertelsmann Foundation forecasts 
that a Greek exit would provoke financial 
crisis, followed by a prolonged eurozone 
downturn.66 Bertelsmann Foundation, 
along with Prognos AG has determined 
that such a scenario would induce total 
loses of €674 billion on the world’s 
top 42 economies. Such an economic 
malaise would undermine any ability to 
realize the fruits of a devalued currency. 
Greek exports might well be cheaper, but 
depressed eurozone consumption would 
limit gains. Argentine-levels of growth 
will not be won by selling cheap olives 
to countries in recession.   
A Suboptimal Recovery
Since the early days of Néstor Kirchner’s 
presidency (2003 – 2007), many have 
predicted the imminent collapse of the 
Argentine economy. Ten years later, no 
such collapse has occurred. Attributing 
Argentina’s rebound from crisis solely 
to dumb luck and China would be 
to underestimate the Kirchners – 
something that Argentines inside and 
outside of the Partido Justicialista have 
learned can be dangerous.
Nevertheless, it’s hard to imagine 
the policymaker who would wish an 
Argentine-esque recovery for his own 
country. Argentina is still a financial 
pariah. It has pushed the US Treasury 
to its wits’ end. The IMF has publicly 
censured the country, while The Economist 
no longer recognizes the government’s 
dubious financial statistics. 
With protests mounting 
in Buenos Aires, even 
Argentina is frustrated 
with Argentina.
Under current President Cristina 
Fernández Kirchner, who succeeded 
her husband in 2007, fiscal spending 
has again become a primary strategy 
to maintain mass support. She has 
expanded pensions and increased 
welfare benefits. Yet, in contrast to Brady 
Bond countries, Argentina cannot access 
international capital, thus challenging 
the ability to finance any deficit.67 
Argentina has resorted to capital controls 
and bizarre import-export regulations 
that leave car manufacturers exporting 
wine and regular citizens waiting longer 
to buy imported goods at steeper prices. 
Meanwhile, inflation is estimated at 
more than 20 percent, and, as of early 
2012, capital was flowing out of the 
country at a pace of US$2 billion per 
month. Subsequent currency controls 
may have stemmed some of this outflow, 
but they have also engendered an 
overvalued peso. The current-account 
surplus – the same surplus required to 
finance fiscal expansion – is dwindling. 
Perhaps a collapse is imminent. More 
likely, the Fernández government will 
ride agricultural and hydrocarbon 
exports to at least stay afloat. Either 
way, the Argentine economy is not 
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exactly a paradigm of recovery. Lacking 
Argentina’s one saving grace (traditional 
commodities), a wholesale Greek 
default is unlikely to offer a more 
stable rebound.  
Suboptimal Currency Zone
In legally pegging the peso to the US 
dollar, the Argentine “convertibility” 
program offers a fascinating experiment 
of a “monetary union” with zero fiscal 
integration. With asymmetric demand 
shocks, divergent growth rates, differing 
inflation expectations and completely 
distinct legal systems, Argentina and 
the US fail just about every traditional 
measure of an optimal currency zone.69
To a certain degree, so too do California 
and Kentucky. Riding the tail end of 
the dot-com boom, California posted 
8.88 percent growth from 1999 to 
2000. In contrast, Kentucky contracted 
0.29 percent during that year, while 
neighboring West Virginia grew a paltry 
0.9 percent.70 If independent, all three 
may have chosen different monetary 
policies – something the centralized 
Federal Reserve Bank precludes. 
However, the fiscally integrated federal 
system had a redistributive effect that 
smoothed inequalities. On a per capita 
basis, federal tax revenue exceeded 
federal spending for each Californian by 
$2,964 in year 2000. West Virginia, on the 
other hand, received a per capita surplus 
of $2,368; Kentucky, a per capita surplus 
of $920.71 This not to imply that life was 
all peaches and growth in West Virginia. 
But the redistribution eased the regional 
inequalities. The US grew 4.9 percent in 
1999 and 4.2 percent in 2000 – by all 
accounts good years.
The Argentine economy contracted by 
3.4 percent in 1999 and 0.8 percent in 
2000. However, unlike Kentucky, there 
would be no fiscal redistribution. When 
the Mexican government falters, the 
US may step in, given the financial and 
social consequences of economic chaos 
south of the border.72 When Argentina 
stumbled in 2001, it was lucky to get a 
message of condolence from Uncle Sam. 
In his highly regarded text on monetary 
unions, Paul de Grauwe writes 
that countries facing asymmetrical 
shocks in a monetary union that 
lacks fiscal mechanisms can resort to 
debt – essentially intergenerational 
redistribution.73 There may well have 
been a capital surplus in the US in year 
2000, but at that point, it surely was not 
going to finance Argentine debt. Thus 
we arrive at a key lesson: Suboptimal 
currency unions without fiscal 
redistribution are and remain highly 
vulnerable to a debt crisis. Argentina 
could not hold the peg, and the resultant 
financial storm washed away billions of 
dollars in savings.
The EU is famously caught in the middle, 
with a shared currency but a miniscule 
centralized budget. With the spread 
between 2011 German and Greek growth 
at more than 10 percent, Greece would 
appear to need some redistributive 
mechanism to counter a lack of monetary 
levers. Yet with Greek debt at over 150 
percent of GDP, it can no longer afford to 
redistribute from the future. 
The European monetary union has 
arrived at a crossroads between 
deeper integration and dissolution. 
The Bertelsmann Foundation forecasts 
economic havoc upon any dissolution, 
but this is what inaction might force. 
EU leaders appear to understand the 
urgency of fiscal integration, scheduling 
a series of talks, as is their wont. The 
European Fiscal Compact aims to enforce 
budgetary norms across the region. Time 
will tell whether this is an improvement 
on the Growth and Stability Pact of 1998-
1999 and a stepping stone to a fiscal 
union. Yet many political battles remain. 
Thus, the Argentine case offers key 
lessons – just not the ones espoused 
by commentators who view the South 
American country’s experience as a 
blueprint for Greece. Rather, the crucial 
differences suggest that a post-exit 
Greece would not match Argentine 
growth of recent years. The Argentine 
economic model remains flawed, 
and growth is sustained by Chinese 
demand – an outlet unavailable to 
Greece. The Argentine experience also 
exposes the fundamental instability of 
a suboptimal currency zone that lacks 
a fiscal mechanism. For Europe, better 
to take Messi, and not messy default, 
from Argentina.     
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Reform Fatigue Can Create 
a Political Backlash that 
Undermines Change
In November, the backlash to externally 
imposed austerity again boiled over. 
Labor unions executed coordinated 
strikes. University students took to 
the streets. Daily life came to a halt as 
citizens protested grinding reforms. 
The harsh economic restructuring was 
demanded by the IMF and backed by 
the regional hegemon as conditional for 
assistance needed to survive a sovereign 
debt crisis. The protests soured, leading 
to hundreds of arrests, a handful of 
deaths and sporadic rioting. 
This story may seem familiar. But it 
does not refer to the November 14, 
2012 austerity protests that shook 
Madrid, Rome and Lisbon. Rather, these 
November protests occurred in 1991. 
And they occurred on the other side of 
the world, in Venezuela.
In comparing Latin American and 
European debt crises, scholars and 
policymakers focus almost uniformly 
on the economics – how to structure a 
haircut, for example, or, perhaps, the 
utility of a currency devaluation. With 
opposition mounting on European 
streets, the political lessons from Latin 
America may prove equally salient. 
Whiplash: The Washington 
Consensus and the New 
Latin American Left
Within three months of those 1991 
protests, a young army officer named 
Hugo Chávez would stage a coup against 
the pro-IMF Venezuelan government. The 
coup failed, but the popular backlash 
would continue, eventually ushering 
Chávez to power in 1999. He proceeded 
to entrench his anti-austerity philosophy 
in government policy. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, nearly all Latin 
American countries turned to the IMF 
for relief. To satisfy preconditions for 
assistance, many of these countries 
adopted structural reforms devised by 
the IMF and the US Treasury Department. 
These reforms, featuring trade 
liberalization, privatization and labor-
market flexibility, reflected developed-
world prescriptions for ailments to 
Latin American economies. Countries 
throughout the region adopted these 
policies, mostly to maintain access 
to official funding and international 
capital markets.
Known collectively as the “Washington 
Consensus”, these neo-liberal economic 
reforms were all but forced upon Latin 
American countries. Proponents of the 
consensus argue that the tenets were 
only employed half-way; that Latin 
American governments tackled the easy 
reforms, but avoided more difficult 
systemic changes. These proponents 
cite Chile as the Washington Consensus’ 
best pupil, and suggest that it is no 
coincidence that the Andean country is 
now knocking on the door of developed-
nation status. 
These proponents have a strong 
argument. However, political momentum 
is often as much about feel as it is 
about fact. Perhaps the Washington 
Consensus was the correct approach; 
perhaps the region would be better off 
had it accepted the full depth of the 
philosophy. However, the feeling turned 
against the consensus. Eventually the 
imported policies provoked a backlash 
as many citizens ultimately rejected 
an economic approach imposed 
in a moment of weakness by more 
powerful agents. 
This distaste helped sweep a series of 
left-leaning politicians to power at the 
turn of the 21st century. From 1999 to 
2006, nearly all major Latin American 
elections featuring two candidates went 
to the one further to the left. The South 
American countries that experimented 
most aggressively with Washington-
oriented reforms are precisely the 
countries that have since drifted furthest 
to the left. In Venezuela, Argentina 
and Bolivia, once poster children of 
the Washington Consensus, voters 
have persistently preferred presidents 
who have promised to roll back 
neoliberal reforms. In Chile, another 
Consensus-stalwart, voters supported 
twenty consecutive years of center-left 
Concertación government.  
What it means for Europe
Washington-based organizations such 
as the IMF, the World Bank and the 
US Treasury pushed aggressively for a 
certain set of reforms in Latin America. 
Owing to the backlash, a number of Latin 
American countries have now adopted 
policies diametrically opposed to those 
espoused in the American capital. 
This is a valuable lesson for Brussels 
and Berlin.
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Like Latin America, peripheral Europe 
initially accepted the international 
prescription for solving the debt crisis. 
Just as Washington Consensus-styled 
leaders assumed power in Latin America 
in the 1990s, so too have “Brussels 
Consensus” leaders taken the helm 
throughout debt-ridden Europe. From 
the Iberian peninsula to the Aegean 
Sea, a new crop of European leaders 
has emerged prepared to implement 
fiscal austerity and structural reforms, 
just as core Europe and the IMF 
have demanded. 
However, if Latin America is any indicator, 
Europe’s persistent stagnation and high 
unemployment rates could prove fertile 
ground for a backlash against reform. In 
fact, throughout peripheral Europe, the 
notion that austerity has been foisted 
upon them by outside organizations 
 Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom 
improved between 1998 – 2010
 Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom 
declined between 1998 – 2010 
 Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom 
declined between 1995 – 1998
 Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom 
 improved between 1995 – 1998
* The degree of reform and backlash varies by country. For example, Chile’s Michelle Bachelet won on a center-left coalition in 2006, yet her 
government largely followed the liberalization script. Scholars have used the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Reform as a proxy for 
adherence to the Washington Consensus. A higher score suggests greater economic  liberalization. 
* Peruvian Persident Alan García (2006 – 2011) ran to the left of outgoing President Toledo, but to the right of runner-up Ollanta Humala
* Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana are not considered
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such as the IMF, or countries such as 
Germany, has given rise to nationalistic 
movements that reject restructuring. 
In Greece, anti-austerity candidate 
Alexis Tsipras came within three 
points of winning the power to form a 
government in Athens. In Italy, support 
for Mario Monti’s Brussels Consensus-
styled government dropped from 54 
percent in November 2011 to 32 percent 
in November 2012, and in the Italian 
general elections of February 2013, the 
man who injected a degree of seriousness 
into Italian politics was trounced at the 
ballot box. Disinterest in traditional 
parties marked the run-up to those 
elections, and the initial results left only 
one thing clear: “Italian voters delivered 
a rousing anti-austerity message and a 
strong rebuke to the existing political 
order,” wrote The New York Times.75
In Spain, the austerity backlash has 
threatened the integrity of the nation as 
Catalonia has demanded independence 
rather than continue under Madrid-led 
reform. The French electorate replaced 
austerity-stalwart Nicolas Sarkozy with 
François Hollande in 2012. The crisis 
has also strengthened nationalist 
movements in core Europe, appealing 
to French and German segments less 
committed to the European project. 
Throughout peripheral Europe, 
austerity fatigue appears to be gaining 
momentum. Perhaps, for these countries, 
the dismantling of cherished safety net 
provisions and worker protection will 
provoke the backlash that privatization 
caused in Latin America. Perhaps 
grinding austerity will lose its appeal as 
a necessary adjustment; perhaps public 
opinion will coalesce around the notion 
that the Brussels Consensus is a foreign 
import forced upon their countries in a 
moment of vulnerability. 
Perhaps, if the lessons from Latin 
America go unheeded, such a backlash 
will push politicians such as Syriza’s 
Alexis Tsipras over the edge and into 
the electoral mainstream. As Hugo 
Chávez’s experience illuminates, the 
tide may not turn immediately, but it 
can turn definitively. As long as Europe 
has paused to consider the economic 
lessons of the Latin American debt 
crisis, it would do well to consider also 
the potential political lessons. 
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This paper has drawn a coherent narrative from a Latin American debt-crisis response that was, for the most part, disjointed and 
uncoordinated. Latin American and US leaders eventually accepted that growth must be a part of the recovery process, not just 
a biannual conference topic. A return to growth jumpstarted stagnant economies, while a market-friendly haircut slayed the debt 
overhang. While far from a linear recovery, a number of governments that pursued this approach have since enjoyed reasonable growth 
and development rates, while becoming respected members of the international financial community. 
Europe’s task today can appear more daunting. The EU cannot easily generate the rapid growth rates characteristic of emerging 
markets. Moreover, peripheral European debt-to-GDP ratios are, in some cases, double the debt burden of Latin American countries 
in the 1980s. The combination of rapid growth and more manageable overall debt helped Latin America rapidly settle outstanding IMF 
accounts. Such a short turnaround will be unlikely for peripheral Europe. 
But Europe also has opportunities that were unavailable to debt-ridden Latin America, such as the potential for increased integration. 
A more cohesive EU could address many of the lessons from Latin America. An expanded ECB mandate, with increased emphasis on 
employment, could promote a monetary policy more appropriate for the entire region. Deeper financial and service-sector integration 
could bolster regional growth and consumption. A fiscal component to the monetary union would smooth inequalities and, in turn, 
protect peripheral consumption of core exports.  
Certainly, lessons from Latin America suggest that the status quo is unsustainable. In the early 2000s, frustration with Washington 
Consensus reforms led to a populist backlash from Ecuador to Argentina. Austerity without growth will result in a similar Brussels 
Consensus backlash in Europe. Nationalists in core Europe will rail against supposedly indolent southerners more concerned with 
siestas and government benefits than reform. Meanwhile, counterparts in peripheral Europe will demand the removal of repressive 
economic policies enforced by the powerful core. As the crisis trudges on, both arguments will find increasingly receptive audiences. 
Such a backlash, replete with unfortunate historical overtones, could result in an erosion of European integration from both sides.    
European policymakers who dismiss the lessons of Latin America as remote chapters from an underdeveloped continent may be 
overlooking answers to a sovereign-debt crisis crawling into its fourth year with no end in sight. The European experiment appears 
stuck at a treacherous crossroads. The Latin American experience of the 1980s offers a roadmap for recovery. Will anyone bother to 
read it?  
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